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Abstract
In this paper we discuss the observational equivalence between two monetary policy
rules: a constant money growth rule and an interest rate rule. From the equilibrium
conditions of a sticky prices model, we consider: (i) the Taylor rule parameter implied
by the model with exogenous money supply; and (ii) the parameter of the money growth
process implied by the model with an interest rate rule. We then compare the parameters
of the two monetary rules in each case to evaluate the equivalence property. We show
that the two monetary policy rules are not observationally equivalent (except in a very
implausible empirical case) and therefore that the way of modeling monetary policy is of
importance.
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Introduction
In this paper, we study under which conditions observational equivalence between interest
rate rule and money growth rule may exist in a sticky prices economy. The question matters
for any economist who wants to model monetary policy. Observational equivalence between
the two monetary policies would lead the model builders not to care about it. Conversely, if
observational equivalence does not hold, the way monetary policy is represented matters. We
show that observational equivalence between the two monetary policy rules is a very special
case and certainly not a general result.
A huge part of the literature is concerned by the monetary transmission mechanism (real
and/or nominal frictions) and does not focus on the consequences of the way monetary policy
is modeled. DSGE models either include a Taylor rule (see Taylor, 1993 and 1999) to represent
monetary policy (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999 and Boivin and Giannoni, 2005), or
consider an exogenous money growth rule (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1997
and 2005 and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde, 2005). Further, Structural Vector
Autoregression assumes that monetary policy changes can be represented by shocks to Federal
Fund Rate and/or Non–Borrowed Reserve (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1998).
They do so by arguing that the way monetary policy is modeled does not matter.
Does it matter? It is known that the way in which policy is described matters because the
interest rate process that is generated by an exogenous money growth rule may or may not
satisfy the Taylor Principle for equilibrium determinacy. The converse is also true. However,
if one does not abstract from this technical issue but consider indeterminate cases when they
appear, the previous question still holds. To go farther answering this issue, we discuss the
observational equivalence between two representations of monetary policy. In a first case,
monetary policy is represented as a stationary stochastic process of the growth rate of money
supply. In the second, monetary policy is of a Taylor–type rule, i.e. a relationship between
interest rate and expected inflation.1
We start from a general equilibrium monetary model, a sticky prices model, that is suffi-
ciently simple to get analytical and explicit results.2 We use this model as a Data Generating
1This paper is related to Vegh (2001) who identifies basic equivalences between monetary rules in a con-
tinuous time environment. It further relates to Schabert (2005) who analyzes the relation between interest
rate targets and money supply in a cash–in–advance model. Notice that we also do so by assuming that the
Taylor–type rule incorporates the current inflation rate.
2This model is chosen because this approach is based on the idea that temporary nominal price rigidities
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Process (DGP) that allows to reproduce some features of actual data, which are taken as
the realization of an unknown stochastic process. Following a common econometric practice
(see Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler, 1999), we first use GMM to estimate the relation between
the nominal interest rate and the expected inflation under the model with exogenous money
growth rule. Second, using OLS, we estimate the money growth relationship under the model
with an interest rate rule.
We first discuss the results when the true monetary policy is the exogenous money growth.
When the parameters that describe private behavior in this economy are calibrated with
respect to their empirical counterparts, the implied estimate of the Taylor rule parameter is
strictly greater than one, provided the growth rate of money supply displays positive serial
correlation. It follows that the estimated value of this parameter is close to the ones of
estimated Taylor rule (see Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler, 2000).3 The estimated parameter of
the Taylor–type rule turns out to be a non–linear decreasing function of the money growth
parameter that accounts for the persistence of money injections. When money injection are
very persistent, the nominal interest rate weakly reacts to expected inflation and the real
interest rate remains almost constant. Conversely, when money injection is almost white
noise, the estimated central bank reaction function implies that the nominal interest rate
strongly responds to expected inflation. It follows that “active” Taylor rule are associated
with weak persistence of money injection.
We then consider the stochastic process of money growth implied by the sticky prices
model with a Taylor rule. As shown by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), including Taylor rule
in this model leads to indeterminacy.
We restrict our analysis to the indeterminate case for two reasons. We show that when
monetary policy is represented by an exogenous money growth rule, the Taylor rule parame-
ter depends on two parameters that describe private behavior and on the money growth rule
parameter. For any empirical plausible value of these parameters, the Taylor rule parameter
will be greater than one. This leads to conclude that observational equivalence may appear
only if the Taylor rule parameter is greater than one. In this case, the model generates inde-
terminacy (see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001). We therefore have to focus on the indeterminacy
provide the key friction that gives rise to nonneutral effects of monetary policy (see Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler,
1999 for a discussion). In addition, the observational equivalence results are consistent in both sticky and
flexible prices frameworks.
3Assuming that the central bank follows an endogenous money growth rule leads to the same conclusions.
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case to study the observational equivalence properties between the different monetary policy
rules. Second, and more important, when studying observational equivalence the interpre-
tation of the parameters of the two monetary policy rules matters. In the determinate case
with the Taylor rule, one may be willing to study observational equivalence by assuming that
monetary policies (money growth rule and interest rate rule) are represented by an AR(1)
process. However, the parameters do not deserve the same interpretation in that case: the
Taylor rule parameter corresponds to the smoothness parameter of the money shock while
the money growth rule parameter is the persistence parameter of the shock. In the indeter-
minate case, the same interpretation may be given to both parameters. For this additional
and important normative reason, we exclude the determinate case from our study.
We determine the dynamic properties of the sticky price model when monetary policy is
represented by a Taylor–type rule. Four sunspots affect the growth rate of money. However,
only one of them may lead to conclude that monetary policies are observationally equivalent.
We then focus on this sunspot that is due to real indeterminacy. In such a case, we show that
when the effect of labor supply behavior and technology do not account for the dynamics
of the model, we retrieve the observational equivalence between the two monetary policies.
The interpretation of the estimated Taylor rule or that of the estimated process of money
growth leads to the same conclusion, i.e. an aggressive Taylor rule can be viewed as weakly
persistent money growth, and vice versa. However, it is not relevant to discard labor supply
and technology effects. Researchers can not think of any serious quantitative model that
could match the labor market stylized facts of, say the US economy, by discarding the role
of these effects. As a matter of fact, we show that when the effect of labor supply behavior
and technology do not account for the dynamics of the model, there is no observational
equivalence between interest rate and money growth rule. Therefore, the modeling choice of
monetary policy is of great importance.
The paper is organized as follows. A first section presents the monetary model and the
equilibrium associated with the two representations of monetary policy. The second section
presents the estimation results of the Taylor rule parameter under the sticky prices model
with exogenous money growth rule. In section three, we estimate the parameter of the money
growth process under the model with a Taylor rule and discuss observational equivalence. A
last section concludes.
4
1. The monetary economy
This section is devoted to an exposition of the model. We set up a sticky prices model
with monopolistic competition, consistent with the monetary transmission mechanism (see
e.g., Hairault and Portier, 1993, King and Wolman, 1996, Gal´ı , 1999, and Ireland, 2001).
The model is deliberately stylized to highlight structural relations between nominal variables
(inflation, interest rate and money growth) and to determine analytically the solution of the
model.
1.1. Households
The economy comprises a unit mass continuum of identical, infinitely–lived households. Each
household has preferences over consumption and leisure represented by the following intertem-
poral utility function :
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
log(Cτ )− h
1+χ
τ
1 + χ
]
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, χ ≥ 0 and ht denotes the number of hours supplied
by the household. Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set
available in period t.
A representative household enters period t with nominal bonds Bt and nominal balances
Mt brought from the previous period. During the period, the household supplies labor ht
at the real wage Wt/Pt. In addition, it receives a lump–sum transfer from the monetary
authorities in the form of cash equal to Tt, profit from the firm Πt, and real interest rate
payments from bond holdings ((Rt−1−1)Bt/Pt). These revenues are used to buy consumption
goods (Ct), money balances (Mt+1) and nominal bonds (Bt+1) in the next period. Therefore,
the budget constraint can be written as
Bt+1 +Mt+1 + PtCt =Wtht +Rt−1Bt +Mt + Tt +Πt.
The household faces a cash–in–advance (CIA) constraint of the form:
PtCt 6Mt + Tt +Rt−1Bt −Bt+1.
Money is held for transaction motives. The household carries cash to purchase consumption
goods. We restrict our attention to equilibria with strictly positive nominal interest rate so
that the cash constraint is always binding. We let Ct denotes a composite consumption index
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defined by :
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
C
(ε−1)/ε
i,t di
)ε/(ε−1)
,
where Ci,t is the quantity of good i ∈ [0, 1] consumed in period t and ε > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution among consumption goods. The price of good i is given by Pi,t and the general
price index Pt is given by:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εi,t di
)1/(1−ε)
.
The household determines its optimal consumption/saving, labor supply and money and
bond holding plans, maximizing utility subject to the budget and cash–in–advance constraint.
The quantity of good i consumed in period t is given by:
Ci,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−ε
Ct.
Consumption behavior together with labor supply yields
hχt
Pt
Wt
= βEt
Pt
Pt+1
1
Ct+1
,
whereas nominal return of bond holdings is given by:
Rt = h
−χ
t
Wt
PtCt
.
This last equation, together with the CIA constraint, determines money demand where, for
a given real wage, real balances are a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate.
1.2. Firms
In this economy, there is a continuum of firms distributed uniformly on the unit interval.
Each firm is indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and produces a differentiated good with a technology which
implies diminishing returns to hours worked
Yi,t = Ahαi,t,
with α ∈ (0, 1] and where A is a strictly positive scale parameter. At the end of period t− 1,
i.e. before observing the realization of the money supply shock in period t, firm i sets the
price Pi,t at which it will be selling good i during period t, for a given aggregate price Pt.
The firm is owned by the household, and pays its profits out to the household at the end of
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each period. Because of the CIA constraint on household consumption, the firm discounts
its profit using Φt+1 = β/(Pt+1Ct+1). Therefore, for a given wage Wt, the firm i will seek to
max
Pi,t
Et−1 [Φt+1 (Pi,tYi,t −Wthi,t)] ,
subject to
Yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−ε
Ct.
The firm’s optimal pre–set price is thus given by:
Pi,t =
ε
α(ε− 1)
Et−1
[
Φt+1Wt(Yi,t/A)1/α
]
Et−1 [Φt+1WtYi,t]
.
1.3. The Government
The government issues nominal bonds Bt to finance open market operations. The government
budget constraint is
Mt+1 +Bt+1 =Mt + Tt +Rt−1Bt,
with M0 and B0 given.
1.4. The Monetary Policy
We consider two alternative monetary policies. In the first case, as is standard in monetary
economics, monetary policy is described by an exogenous money growth rule. In the second
case, monetary policy is represented by a Taylor–type rule describing how a central bank sets
the nominal interest rate in response to economic variables. In what follows, we provide the
details of the monetary rules we consider.4
1.4.1. Exogenous Money Growth Rule
Money is exogenously supplied according to the following rule
Mt+1 = γtMt,
in which the gross rate of money growth γt follows an AR(1) process:
log(γt) = ργ log(γt−1) + (1− ργ) log(γ¯) + εγt . (1)
4As suggested by a referee, we also consider an endogenous money growth rule (see Section 2) and a more
familiar form of the Taylor rule which incorporates the current inflation rate (see Section 3).
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εγt is white noise with unit variance σεγ > 0 and |ργ | < 1. In this case, the Central Bank could
implement what is essentially the classic textbook policy of dropping freshly printed money
from a helicopter. A money–financed cut is then essentially equivalent to Milton Friedman’s
famous “helicopter drop of money”.
1.4.2. Interest Rate Rule
We specify the following Taylor–type rule
R̂t = ηEtpit+1, (2)
where a hat denotes the percentage of deviation from the long run value. This Taylor–type
rule incorporates only the expected inflation rate and aims at describing the joint behavior
of the nominal interest rate and expected inflation. We choose this Taylor–type rule for
many reasons. First, we adopt this specification as our benchmark Taylor–type rule because
it simplifies the exposition of results. Resorting to such a parsimonious rule allows us to
synthesize the complex process of monetary policy with the minimum number of parameters.
Nevertheless, we check the robustness of our results to different forms of this rule and since the
results are similar, we stick to this simple form of the Taylor rule. Second, there are many
empirical findings that were obtained using this rule. For example, Batini and Haddane
(1998), and Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1998) and (2000) provide GMM estimates of this rule
and strong evidence of an increase in the real interest rate facing higher expected inflation.
Most of empirical studies suggests an estimated value of η significantly greater than one and
in some cases close to two (see Kozicki (1999) for a survey). Third, previous empirical results
suggest that the estimated parameter of the (expected) output gap is marginally significant
for the Volcker–Greenspan era (see Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler, 2000). Conversely, estimates
of η are significant, positive and exceed unity in most cases (see Taylor, 1999 and Clarida,
Gal´ı and Gertler, 2000). Fourth, such rules have been shown to follow actual monetary
policy rather well in a number of countries (see Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler, 2000). Last but
not least, similar reaction functions are used in the Quarterly Projection Model of the Bank
of Canada and in the Forecasting and Policy System of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
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1.5. Equilibrium Conditions
An equilibrium is a sequence of prices and allocations, such that each price, allocations
maximize both profits and utility, and all markets clear. In a symmetric equilibrium, all
firms will set the same price Pt and choose identical outputs and hours. Goods market
clearing requires Ct = Ci,t = Yt = Yi,t for all i ∈ [0, 1] and all t. The equilibrium conditions
can be approximated by log-linearization about the deterministic steady state:
R̂t = Etγ̂t+1, (3)
pit = γ̂t + ŷt−1 − ŷt, (4)
ŷt = γ̂t − Et−1γ̂t − α1 + χEt−1γ̂t+1, (5)
where γt =Mt+1/Mt denote the gross rate of money growth.
1.5.1. Equilibrium conditions with a Money Growth Rule
Using the money growth rule (1) and the previous equilibrium conditions, we obtain the
following model solution:
R̂t = ργ γ̂t, (6)
pit =
(
1 + ργ
(
1 +
αργ
1 + χ
))
γ̂t−1 − ργ
(
1 +
αργ
1 + χ
)
γ̂t−2, (7)
ŷt = γ̂t − ργ
(
1 +
αργ
1 + χ
)
γ̂t−1. (8)
1.5.2. Equilibrium conditions with a Taylor Rule
As shown by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), the inclusion of a Taylor rule in this model leads
to indeterminacy. Under the interest rate policy (2), money supply is endogenous. From (4)
and (2), it follows that
Etγ̂t+1 =
η
1− η (ŷt − Etŷt+1) .
Now, using (5) and taking expectations at period t − 1, we obtain the first–order linear
difference equation for output
Et−1ŷt+1 =
αη − (1 + χ)(η − 1)
(1 + χ)η
Et−1ŷt. (9)
The dynamic properties of the equilibrium critically depend on the value of η with respect
to the unit circle. We define η?, with η? ≡ (1 + χ)/(2(1 + χ) − α), as a threshold value
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for indeterminacy. When η < η?, the equilibrium is locally determinate. Conversely, the
equilibrium is locally indeterminate when η > η?. The threshold value η? is positive and can
exceed one provided that χ (resp. α) is sufficiently small (resp. large). We concentrate on
positive values of η, because previous empirical studies suggest that this parameter is strictly
greater than one (see Taylor, 1999 and Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler 1998, 2000, among others).
In this case, aggressive policies (η > 1) lead to real indeterminacy. As stated by Carlstrom et
Fuerst (2001), this aggressive monetary policy is the basis of indeterminacy since it implies
that nominal and real interest rates move along the same line.5
Let
ϕ =
αη − (1 + χ)(η − 1)
(1 + χ)η
,
whereupon equation (9) becomes:
ŷt = ϕŷt−1 + ε
y,1
t + ε
y,2
t−1 − ϕεy,3t−1, (10)
where εy,1t , ε
y,2
t−1 and ε
y,3
t−1 are martingale difference sequences satisfyingEt−2ε
y,1
t = 0, Et−2ε
y,2
t−1 =
0 and Et−2ε
y,3
t−1 = 0. These terms are sunspot variables which are consistent with rational
expectations equilibrium. Therefore, when indeterminate, the sticky prices model with a
Taylor rule implies three types of sunspot variables that affect real variables. The fact that
εy,2t and ε
y,3
t have similar quantitative implications (as may be easily verified) allows us to
focus on a single sunspot (see discussion bellow).
Moreover, nominal indeterminacy occurs for any value of η and ϕ:
γ̂t = ε
g
t +
η(1− ϕ)
1− η ŷt−1 −
η
1− η ε
y,2
t−1 +
ηϕ
1− η ε
y,3
t−1, (11)
where Et−1ε
g
t = 0. By nominal indeterminacy, we mean that the inflation rate is free, i.e.
there is nothing to pin down the initial growth rate of money. Consequently, the growth rate
of money is determined by four sunspots.
Therefore, aggregate fluctuations in deviation from the deterministic steady–state, depend
on the parameters of the monetary policy η, the parameters that describe the private behavior
(χ and α) and on those summarizing the sunspot variables, i.e. their relative variances.
5As explained by Carlstrom et Fuerst (2001), the mechanism that leads to indeterminacy is as follows.
Consider a sunspot-driven increase in current consumption. When η > η?, the intertemporal allocation of
saving lowers the real interest rate and thus the nominal interest rate. The intratemporal allocation raises real
balances and thus consumption increases due to the CIA constraint. This increases in consumption completes
the circle because it insures that initial beliefs are rational.
10
Given the solution of the two models, we consider below: (i) the Taylor rule parameter
(ηρ) implied by the sticky prices model with exogenous money supply, and (ii) the parameter
of the money growth process (ρη) implied by the model with a Taylor rule. We then compare
the two parameters in order to evaluate some equivalence properties.
2. The Estimated Interest Rate Rule
Any monetary rule must be estimated using aggregate data which are the realizations of
economic equilibrium, i.e. a reduced form that defines a set of endogenous variables in terms
of exogenous and predetermined variables. Therefore, the econometrician must use a set of
relevant instrumental variables in order to identify and estimate the structural equation that
characterizes central bank behavior. Empirical studies on the Taylor rule generally use lagged
inflation and the lagged nominal interest rate as instrumental variables (see Clarida, Gal´ı and
Gertler, 1998, 2000). Using the same procedure, we estimate the relation between the nominal
interest rate and expected inflation under the sticky prices model with an exogenous money
growth rule.
We assume that the monetary model (6)–(8) with exogenous money growth rule con-
stitutes the “true” Data Generating Process (DGP). This DGP permits actual data to be
generated. Such data are taken as the realization of a stochastic process, that is, unknown
to the econometrician. The features in which we are interested include conditional moments
of the nominal interest rate and inflation. Rule (2) can be expressed in terms of observable :
R̂t = ηρpit+1 + εt+1, (12)
where εt+1 = −ηρ (pit+1 −Etpit+1). The econometrician observes values of the nominal in-
terest rate R̂t and the inflation rate pit+1 and uses these data as actual data without any
explicit knowledge about the DGP. To estimate central bank behavior, the econometrician
uses a set of instrumental variables that aim at describing informative shifts in money demand
behavior. For simplicity and tractability, we assume that the econometrician uses a single
instrument. As we are interested in co-movements of the nominal interest rate and inflation,
the necessary condition for identification of the central bank policy function is fulfilled. Let
zt denote a single instrument known in period t. To be a valid instrument zt must satisfy the
following orthogonality condition
E (εt+1zt) = 0,
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or equivalently
E
((
R̂t − ηρpit+1
)
zt
)
= 0. (13)
Equation (13) is the basis for GMM estimation of the parameter η. Since the number of
orthogonality conditions is equal to the number of parameters of interest, it follows that the
GMM estimator (or IV estimator in this simple case) is free from any weighting matrix and
can be obtained directly as the sample counterpart of (13).6 Following previous empirical
work (see Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler, 2000), an appropriate instrumental variable is the once
lagged inflation rate.7 The orthogonality condition (13) becomes:
E
((
R̂t − ηρpit+1
)
pit−1
)
= 0. (14)
From (14), the plim of the GMM estimator ηρ is thus given by:
ηρ =
Covρ
(
R̂t, pit−1
)
Covρ (pit+1, pit−1)
. (15)
The GMM estimator ηρ is obtained from the autocovariance functions of the processes of
inflation and nominal interest rate.
Proposition 1. The plim of the GMM estimator ηρ under the sticky price model with
exogenous money growth rule is given by:
ηρ =
1 + χ
(1 + χ)− α(1− ργ) .
The econometrician could also use the current inflation rate as an instrumental variable,
because, in the sticky price model, inflation responds with one lag to monetary innovations.
Current inflation is thus uncorrelated with the error term εγt .
We study the evolution of the GMM estimator η̂ρ of η with respect to the three param-
eters χ, α and ργ . When α = 1 and χ = 0, the GMM estimator η̂ρ of η is equal to 1/ργ .
It follows that the GMM estimator is strictly positive, provided the growth rate of money
supply displays positive serial correlation. Further, when we consider values for ργ that cor-
respond to the range of existing OLS estimates with M1 and M2 (in the interval (1/2, 2/3)),
6The estimator is called a GMM estimator by an abuse of terminology. In fact, it is a IV estimator that
corresponds to a GMM estimator at the limit.
7Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000) include lagged inflation rates up to four lags. To keep tractable results,
we do not introduce over–identifying conditions and consider only one lag inflation rate as the instrumental
variable. However, our results are left unaffected when over–identifying conditions are considered.
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the estimated value of η is close to those of previously estimated Taylor rules (see Clarida,
Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), tables II and III, p 157 and 160).8
In addition, it is easy to see that η̂ρ is decreasing in χ. When labor supply is inelastic, the
GMM estimator η̂ρ of η leads to one. In such a case, the model exactly reproduces a Fisher
equation. Indeed, when labor supply is inelastic, households cannot avoid the inflation tax
created by monetary policy. Finally, η̂ρ is increasing in α and decreasing in ργ . To study the
evolution of the GMM estimator η̂ρ of η with respect to ργ , we calibrate χ and α with respect
to their empirical counterparts. We set χ = 1 (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005
and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde, 2005) and α = 0.6 (see Cooley and Prescott,
1995). We then let ργ free to vary within the interval [0.2; 0.8] – which corresponds to a
large enough interval to take into account all the plausible empirical values of this parameter
– and plot the evolution of the GMM estimator η̂ρ. Figure 1 clearly highlights that for
Figure 1: Implied value ηρ
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
ρ
η ρ
Note: The figure is obtained for χ = 1 and α = 0.6.
plausible values of the three parameters χ, α and ργ , the estimated value of η is greater
8Notice that we checked the robustness of this result to the introduction of capital accumulation in the
model. The results are unaffected also when we consider different types of shocks or when the lagged interest
rate is introduced in the interest rate rule.
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than one and is not far from those of previously estimated Taylor rules (see Taylor, 1999 and
Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler, 2000, among others). The GMM estimator η̂ρ of η depends on
ργ which summarizes monetary policy. The estimated parameter of the Taylor–type rule is a
non–linear decreasing function of ργ , which accounts for the persistence of money injections.
When money injections are very persistent (ργ → 1), the nominal interest rate weakly reacts
to expected inflation and the real interest rate remains almost constant. Conversely, when
money injections are almost white noise (ργ → 0), the estimated central bank’s reaction
function implies that the nominal interest rate strongly responds to expected inflation. It
follows that “active” Taylor rules – large positive values of η – are associated with weak
persistency of money injections.
We may also consider an endogenous money growth rule. In such a situation, the central
bank adjusts the supply of money in response to changes in inflation. Let us assume the
following simple rule:
γ̂t = ξpit + γ˜t,
where
γ˜t = ργ γ˜t−1 + εt.
The properties of this rule, in terms of local price determination, have been examined by Black
[1974] and more recently by Schabert [2006] by considering different fiscal policy regimes. We
consider this rule for one main reason. In this case, the money growth rate depends on the
inflation rate. In such a case, the central bank aims at stabilizing the inflation rate by
adjusting the quantity of money in circulation in the economy. The Taylor rule considered
in the paper is also a stabilizing rule. The two rules are therefore comparable in a deep
sense. To ease the comparison, we plot on a same figure, the implied value ηρ when the
money growth rule is assumed to be exogenous and endogenous. In the case where the
money growth rule is endogenous, Figure 2 highlights that for plausible values of χ and α
and for a large enough interval of values of ξ, the estimated value of η is very close to one,
and more importantly greater than one since ξ is greater than −0.6. As a matter of fact,
these estimated values are also close from those of previously estimated Taylor rules. For the
same parameters, the estimated value of ηρ is greater than one when the money growth rule
is exogenous. Therefore, our conclusion holds independent of whether the money growth rule
is endogenous or exogenous.
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Figure 2: Implied value ηρ
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
ξ
η ρ
Endogenous Money Growth Rule
Exogenous Money Growth Rule
Note: The figure is obtained for χ = 1, α = 0.6 and ργ = 0.5.
Finally, we check the robustness of these results against different forms of the Taylor rule.
As a matter of fact, the results are similar with other forms of the Taylor–type rule. For
instance, we assume that the Taylor rule incorporates only the current inflation rate. We
expose this case in the paper, because it is directly related to the previous robustness check.
Indeed, one may also want to compare the observational equivalence result obtained under
the model with endogenous money growth rule that incorporates the current inflation rate
and a Taylor–type rule that also considers the current inflation rate. In this case, the implied
static Taylor rule under the sticky price model with exogenous money supply rule has then
the form:
R̂t = ηρpit + ζt,
where
ηρ =
1 + χ
(1 + χ)− α(1− ργ) .
The results are similar to those exposed in Proposition 1 with one additional term, ζt, that
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is a stochastic variable which follows an ARMA(1,1) process:
ζt = ργζt−1 + ργ
(
εt − 1
ηρργ
εt−1
)
.
It is therefore easy to see that the implied Taylor rule is more complicated than the previous
one since it includes persistent shocks. These findings are in line with the results presented
in Rudebusch [2002] and [2005]. These papers highlight that the persistence of the nominal
interest rate is due to the persistence of monetary policy shocks. The results are thus at
once more parsimonious when a Taylor rule that incorporates the expected inflation rate is
considered. This leads us to choose in our exposition of the results a Taylor rule that does
not consider the current inflation rate. For the same reason, we do not present the results
when the Taylor rule incorporates the lagged interest rate.
3. The Estimated Money Growth Rule
We consider the stochastic process of money growth implied by the sticky price model with
a Taylor rule. We will seek to verify whether or not there exists an observational equivalence
between the two monetary rules.
From (10) and (11), the dynamics of the growth rate of money is given by:
γ̂t = ϕγ̂t−1 + (1− ϕL)εgt + e1t + (1− L)e2t + (1− ϕL)e3t .
where L is the backshift operator. The random variables e1t , e
2
t and e
3
t are given by:
e1t =
ηϕ
1− η ε
y1
t−1,
e2t = −
η
1− η ε
y2
t−1,
e3t =
ηϕ
1− η ε
y3
t−1.
Some sunspot variables enter this equation. However, when money growth is governed
by εgt or e
3
t , it is iid, a result which is at odds with empirical evidence. In the same way, the
random variable e2t implies a unit root in the moving average, which is again not supported
by the data. Consequently, we discard these three types of shocks from our analysis, because
they imply that we can never find any observational equivalence between the two monetary
policy rules. We concentrate our analysis on e1t because it implies that the growth rate
of money follows an AR(1) process, which can be potentially comparable with that of an
exogenous money growth rule.
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Proposition 2. The plim of the OLS estimator under the sticky price model with a Taylor
type rule is:
ρη =
αη − (1 + χ)(η − 1)
(1 + χ)η
.
This proposition leads to important conclusions for quantitative researchers and policy-
makers. First, in the special case where α = 1 and χ = 0, the plim of the OLS estimator
reduces to: ρη = 1/η, and thus we obtain the observational equivalence between the two
rules. Second, this special case is not empirically relevant; and, except for this particular
case, there does not exist any observational equivalence between the two monetary policy
rules. Figure 3 highlights this result. To compute the figure we proceed as follows. First, we
set values for ργ on a grid [0.3, 1]. Second, we compute ηρ using the formula of Proposition
1. Third, we use the implied value of η to compute ρη using the formula of Proposition 3. If
observational equivalence holds, the implied two curves in the (ρ, η) plan must coincide. If
not, there is no observational equivalence.
Figure 3: Rules and Implied Rules
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Note: The solid line represents the implies values of ηρ w.r.t ργ ; The
dashed line represents the implied value of ρη w.r.t. η.
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The figure clearly shows that observational equivalence between the two representations
of the monetary policy is only a special case that depends on the parameters that describe
private behavior in this economy. Therefore, the modeling choice for monetary policy is
important because it yields very different dynamic properties.
What is driving this result may be explained as follows. In the model with exogenous
money growth rule, inflation expectations are governed by the persistence of the inflation tax,
i.e. the persistence parameter ργ of money supply. When ργ leads to 1, expected inflation
is equal to the nominal interest rate and thus ηρ leads to 1. In the model with a Taylor
rule, the dynamic behavior of endogenous money supply inherits the behavior of output. The
autoregressive parameter in the output equation includes the Taylor rule parameter η, as well
as the other parameters α and χ that describe private behavior. When the effect of these two
parameters is canceled (i.e. when α = 1 and χ = 0), the autoregressive parameter will depend
only on the Taylor rule parameter, and we retrieve the observational equivalence under this
restricted version of the model. On the contrary, when the effect of labor supply behavior and
technology account for the dynamics of the model, the observational equivalence vanishes.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper discusses the observational equivalence between two representations of monetary
policy. Firstly, monetary policy is represented by an exogenous money growth rule. Secondly,
monetary policy is represented by an interest rate rule. This is done using a sticky prices
economy. We consider (i) the Taylor rule parameter implied by the sticky prices model with
exogenous money supply; and (ii) the parameter of the money growth process implied by
the model with a Taylor rule. We compare the two parameters in order to evaluate some
equivalence properties. We show that the two monetary policy rules are not observationally
equivalent (except in a very implausible empirical case). Therefore, the modeling choice of
monetary policy is important.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. An easy way to obtain Proposition 1 relies on the cross equation
restrictions between these two variables. Indeed, expected inflation can be expressed as
Etpit+1 =
(
1 + ργ
(
1 +
αργ
1 + χ
))
γ̂t − ργ
(
1 +
αργ
1 + χ
)
γ̂t−1,
=
(
1 +
αργ
1 + χ
)
(γ̂t − ργ γ̂t−1) +
(
αργ + 1 + χ− α
1 + χ
)
ργ γ̂t,
=
(
1 +
αργ
1 + χ
)
εγt +
(
αργ + 1 + χ− α
1 + χ
)
R̂t,
and we obtain
R̂t =
1 + χ
1 + χ− α(1− ργ)Etpit+1 + ε˜
γ
t ,
where ε˜γt = − 1+χ+αργ1+χ−α(1−ργ)ε
γ
t . In the sticky price model, expected inflation verifies Etpit+1 =
pit+1 and the previous expression is equivalent to:
R̂t =
1 + χ
1 + χ− α(1− ργ)pit+1 + ε˜
γ
t .
The error term ε˜γt thus verifies
E (εγt |pit−1) = 0,
since pit−1 is a linear function of
{
εγt−1, ε
γ
t−2, . . .
}
. Now, if we apply the conditional expectation
operator to both sides of the equation, we obtain:
E
(
R̂t|pit−1
)
=
1 + χ
1 + χ− α(1− ργ)E (pit+1|pit−1) ,
and we deduce that
ηρ ≡ 1 + χ1 + χ− α(1− ργ) =
Covρ
(
R̂t, pit−1
)
Covρ (pit+1, pit−1)
.
¥
Proof of Proposition 2. The plim of the OLS estimator satisfies
ρη =
Covη(γ̂t, γ̂t−1)
Vη(γ̂t)
,
= ϕ+
Covη(e1t , γ̂t−1)
Vη(γ̂t)
,
=
αη − (1 + χ)(η − 1)
(1 + χ)η
,
as γ̂t−1 is a linear function of {e1t−1, e1t−2, ...}. ¥
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